Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
m
5e88384fab feat: append-only audit trail for all mutations (P0) 2026-03-30 11:08:41 +02:00
m
b36247dfb9 feat: append-only audit trail for all mutations (P0)
- Database: kanzlai.audit_log table with RLS, append-only policies
  (no UPDATE/DELETE), indexes for entity, user, and time queries
- Backend: AuditService.Log() with context-based tenant/user/IP/UA
  extraction, wired into all 7 services (case, deadline, appointment,
  document, note, party, tenant)
- API: GET /api/audit-log with entity_type, entity_id, user_id,
  from/to date, and pagination filters
- Frontend: Protokoll tab on case detail page with chronological
  audit entries, diff preview, and pagination

Required by § 50 BRAO and DSGVO Art. 5(2).
2026-03-30 11:02:28 +02:00
m
c15d5b72f2 fix: critical security hardening — tenant isolation, CORS, error leaking, input validation
1. Tenant isolation bypass (CRITICAL): TenantResolver now verifies user
   has access to X-Tenant-ID via user_tenants lookup before setting context.
   Added VerifyAccess method to TenantLookup interface and TenantService.

2. Consolidated tenant resolution: Removed duplicate resolveTenant() from
   helpers.go and tenant resolution from auth middleware. TenantResolver is
   now the single source of truth. Deadlines and AI handlers use
   auth.TenantFromContext() instead of direct DB queries.

3. CalDAV credential masking: tenant settings responses now mask CalDAV
   passwords with "********" via maskSettingsPassword helper. Applied to
   GetTenant, ListTenants, and UpdateSettings responses.

4. CORS + security headers: New middleware/security.go with CORS
   (restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN) and security headers (X-Frame-Options,
   X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, Referrer-Policy, X-XSS-Protection).

5. Internal error leaking: All writeError(w, 500, err.Error()) replaced
   with internalError() that logs via slog and returns generic "internal
   error" to client. Same for jsonError in tenant handler.

6. Input validation: Max length on title (500), description (10000),
   case_number (100), search (200). Pagination clamped to max 100.
   Content-Disposition filename sanitized against header injection.

Regression test added for tenant access denial (403 on unauthorized
X-Tenant-ID). All existing tests pass, go vet clean.
2026-03-30 11:01:14 +02:00
m
fe97fed56d feat: add CalDAV settings UI and team management pages (Phase 3P)
Backend: PUT /api/tenants/{id}/settings endpoint for updating tenant
settings (JSONB merge). Frontend: /einstellungen page with CalDAV
config (URL, credentials, calendar path, sync toggle, interval),
manual sync button, live sync status display. /einstellungen/team
page with member list, invite-by-email, role management.
2026-03-25 14:26:05 +01:00
m
0b6bab8512 feat: add tenant + auth backend endpoints (Phase 1A)
Tenant management:
- POST /api/tenants — create tenant (creator becomes owner)
- GET /api/tenants — list tenants for authenticated user
- GET /api/tenants/:id — tenant details with access check
- POST /api/tenants/:id/invite — invite user by email (owner/admin)
- DELETE /api/tenants/:id/members/:uid — remove member
- GET /api/tenants/:id/members — list members

New packages:
- internal/services/tenant_service.go — CRUD on tenants + user_tenants
- internal/handlers/tenant_handler.go — HTTP handlers with auth checks
- internal/auth/tenant_resolver.go — X-Tenant-ID header middleware,
  defaults to user's first tenant for scoped routes

Authorization: owners/admins can invite and remove members. Cannot
remove the last owner. Users can remove themselves. TenantResolver
applies to resource routes (cases, deadlines, etc.) but not tenant
management routes.
2026-03-25 13:27:39 +01:00