c15d5b72f2
1. Tenant isolation bypass (CRITICAL): TenantResolver now verifies user has access to X-Tenant-ID via user_tenants lookup before setting context. Added VerifyAccess method to TenantLookup interface and TenantService. 2. Consolidated tenant resolution: Removed duplicate resolveTenant() from helpers.go and tenant resolution from auth middleware. TenantResolver is now the single source of truth. Deadlines and AI handlers use auth.TenantFromContext() instead of direct DB queries. 3. CalDAV credential masking: tenant settings responses now mask CalDAV passwords with "********" via maskSettingsPassword helper. Applied to GetTenant, ListTenants, and UpdateSettings responses. 4. CORS + security headers: New middleware/security.go with CORS (restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN) and security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, Referrer-Policy, X-XSS-Protection). 5. Internal error leaking: All writeError(w, 500, err.Error()) replaced with internalError() that logs via slog and returns generic "internal error" to client. Same for jsonError in tenant handler. 6. Input validation: Max length on title (500), description (10000), case_number (100), search (200). Pagination clamped to max 100. Content-Disposition filename sanitized against header injection. Regression test added for tenant access denial (403 on unauthorized X-Tenant-ID). All existing tests pass, go vet clean.
50 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
50 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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)
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// SecurityHeaders adds standard security headers to all responses.
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func SecurityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
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w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
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w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block")
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w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains")
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w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// CORS returns middleware that restricts cross-origin requests to the given origin.
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// If allowedOrigin is empty, CORS headers are not set (same-origin only).
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func CORS(allowedOrigin string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
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if allowedOrigin != "" && origin != "" && matchOrigin(origin, allowedOrigin) {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowedOrigin)
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization, X-Tenant-ID")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
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w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
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}
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// Handle preflight
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// matchOrigin checks if the request origin matches the allowed origin.
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func matchOrigin(origin, allowed string) bool {
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return strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimRight(origin, "/"), strings.TrimRight(allowed, "/"))
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}
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