c15d5b72f2
1. Tenant isolation bypass (CRITICAL): TenantResolver now verifies user has access to X-Tenant-ID via user_tenants lookup before setting context. Added VerifyAccess method to TenantLookup interface and TenantService. 2. Consolidated tenant resolution: Removed duplicate resolveTenant() from helpers.go and tenant resolution from auth middleware. TenantResolver is now the single source of truth. Deadlines and AI handlers use auth.TenantFromContext() instead of direct DB queries. 3. CalDAV credential masking: tenant settings responses now mask CalDAV passwords with "********" via maskSettingsPassword helper. Applied to GetTenant, ListTenants, and UpdateSettings responses. 4. CORS + security headers: New middleware/security.go with CORS (restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN) and security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, Referrer-Policy, X-XSS-Protection). 5. Internal error leaking: All writeError(w, 500, err.Error()) replaced with internalError() that logs via slog and returns generic "internal error" to client. Same for jsonError in tenant handler. 6. Input validation: Max length on title (500), description (10000), case_number (100), search (200). Pagination clamped to max 100. Content-Disposition filename sanitized against header injection. Regression test added for tenant access denial (403 on unauthorized X-Tenant-ID). All existing tests pass, go vet clean.
94 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
94 lines
2.2 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx"
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)
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type Middleware struct {
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jwtSecret []byte
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db *sqlx.DB
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}
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func NewMiddleware(jwtSecret string, db *sqlx.DB) *Middleware {
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return &Middleware{jwtSecret: []byte(jwtSecret), db: db}
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}
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func (m *Middleware) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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token := extractBearerToken(r)
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if token == "" {
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"missing authorization token"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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userID, err := m.verifyJWT(token)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"invalid token"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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ctx := ContextWithUserID(r.Context(), userID)
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// Tenant resolution is handled by TenantResolver middleware for scoped routes.
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// Tenant management routes handle their own access control.
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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func (m *Middleware) verifyJWT(tokenStr string) (uuid.UUID, error) {
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parsedToken, err := jwt.Parse(tokenStr, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
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if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", t.Header["alg"])
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}
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return m.jwtSecret, nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return uuid.Nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing JWT: %w", err)
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}
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if !parsedToken.Valid {
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return uuid.Nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid JWT token")
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}
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claims, ok := parsedToken.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
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if !ok {
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return uuid.Nil, fmt.Errorf("extracting JWT claims")
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}
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if exp, ok := claims["exp"].(float64); ok {
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if time.Now().Unix() > int64(exp) {
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return uuid.Nil, fmt.Errorf("JWT token has expired")
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}
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}
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sub, ok := claims["sub"].(string)
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if !ok {
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return uuid.Nil, fmt.Errorf("missing sub claim in JWT")
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}
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userID, err := uuid.Parse(sub)
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if err != nil {
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return uuid.Nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid user ID format: %w", err)
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}
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return userID, nil
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}
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func extractBearerToken(r *http.Request) string {
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auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if auth == "" {
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return ""
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}
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parts := strings.SplitN(auth, " ", 2)
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if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "bearer") {
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return ""
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}
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return parts[1]
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}
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