Files
KanzlAI-mGMT/backend/internal/handlers/tenant_handler.go
m c15d5b72f2 fix: critical security hardening — tenant isolation, CORS, error leaking, input validation
1. Tenant isolation bypass (CRITICAL): TenantResolver now verifies user
   has access to X-Tenant-ID via user_tenants lookup before setting context.
   Added VerifyAccess method to TenantLookup interface and TenantService.

2. Consolidated tenant resolution: Removed duplicate resolveTenant() from
   helpers.go and tenant resolution from auth middleware. TenantResolver is
   now the single source of truth. Deadlines and AI handlers use
   auth.TenantFromContext() instead of direct DB queries.

3. CalDAV credential masking: tenant settings responses now mask CalDAV
   passwords with "********" via maskSettingsPassword helper. Applied to
   GetTenant, ListTenants, and UpdateSettings responses.

4. CORS + security headers: New middleware/security.go with CORS
   (restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN) and security headers (X-Frame-Options,
   X-Content-Type-Options, HSTS, Referrer-Policy, X-XSS-Protection).

5. Internal error leaking: All writeError(w, 500, err.Error()) replaced
   with internalError() that logs via slog and returns generic "internal
   error" to client. Same for jsonError in tenant handler.

6. Input validation: Max length on title (500), description (10000),
   case_number (100), search (200). Pagination clamped to max 100.
   Content-Disposition filename sanitized against header injection.

Regression test added for tenant access denial (403 on unauthorized
X-Tenant-ID). All existing tests pass, go vet clean.
2026-03-30 11:01:14 +02:00

308 lines
8.3 KiB
Go

package handlers
import (
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"mgit.msbls.de/m/KanzlAI-mGMT/internal/auth"
"mgit.msbls.de/m/KanzlAI-mGMT/internal/services"
)
type TenantHandler struct {
svc *services.TenantService
}
func NewTenantHandler(svc *services.TenantService) *TenantHandler {
return &TenantHandler{svc: svc}
}
// CreateTenant handles POST /api/tenants
func (h *TenantHandler) CreateTenant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := auth.UserFromContext(r.Context())
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
var req struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Slug string `json:"slug"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid request body", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if req.Name == "" || req.Slug == "" {
jsonError(w, "name and slug are required", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
tenant, err := h.svc.Create(r.Context(), userID, req.Name, req.Slug)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to create tenant", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
jsonResponse(w, tenant, http.StatusCreated)
}
// ListTenants handles GET /api/tenants
func (h *TenantHandler) ListTenants(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := auth.UserFromContext(r.Context())
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
tenants, err := h.svc.ListForUser(r.Context(), userID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to list tenants", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Mask CalDAV passwords in tenant settings
for i := range tenants {
tenants[i].Settings = maskSettingsPassword(tenants[i].Settings)
}
jsonResponse(w, tenants, http.StatusOK)
}
// GetTenant handles GET /api/tenants/{id}
func (h *TenantHandler) GetTenant(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := auth.UserFromContext(r.Context())
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
tenantID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid tenant ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Verify user has access to this tenant
role, err := h.svc.GetUserRole(r.Context(), userID, tenantID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to get user role", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if role == "" {
jsonError(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
tenant, err := h.svc.GetByID(r.Context(), tenantID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to get tenant", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if tenant == nil {
jsonError(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
// Mask CalDAV password before returning
tenant.Settings = maskSettingsPassword(tenant.Settings)
jsonResponse(w, tenant, http.StatusOK)
}
// InviteUser handles POST /api/tenants/{id}/invite
func (h *TenantHandler) InviteUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := auth.UserFromContext(r.Context())
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
tenantID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid tenant ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Only owners and admins can invite
role, err := h.svc.GetUserRole(r.Context(), userID, tenantID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to get user role", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if role != "owner" && role != "admin" {
jsonError(w, "only owners and admins can invite users", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var req struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
Role string `json:"role"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid request body", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if req.Email == "" {
jsonError(w, "email is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if req.Role == "" {
req.Role = "member"
}
if req.Role != "member" && req.Role != "admin" {
jsonError(w, "role must be member or admin", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
ut, err := h.svc.InviteByEmail(r.Context(), tenantID, req.Email, req.Role)
if err != nil {
// These are user-facing validation errors (user not found, already member)
jsonError(w, "failed to invite user", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
jsonResponse(w, ut, http.StatusCreated)
}
// RemoveMember handles DELETE /api/tenants/{id}/members/{uid}
func (h *TenantHandler) RemoveMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := auth.UserFromContext(r.Context())
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
tenantID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid tenant ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
memberID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("uid"))
if err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid member ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Only owners and admins can remove members (or user removing themselves)
role, err := h.svc.GetUserRole(r.Context(), userID, tenantID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to get user role", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if role != "owner" && role != "admin" && userID != memberID {
jsonError(w, "insufficient permissions", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if err := h.svc.RemoveMember(r.Context(), tenantID, memberID); err != nil {
// These are user-facing validation errors (not a member, last owner, etc.)
jsonError(w, "failed to remove member", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
jsonResponse(w, map[string]string{"status": "removed"}, http.StatusOK)
}
// UpdateSettings handles PUT /api/tenants/{id}/settings
func (h *TenantHandler) UpdateSettings(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := auth.UserFromContext(r.Context())
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
tenantID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid tenant ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Only owners and admins can update settings
role, err := h.svc.GetUserRole(r.Context(), userID, tenantID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to get user role", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if role != "owner" && role != "admin" {
jsonError(w, "only owners and admins can update settings", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var settings json.RawMessage
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&settings); err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid request body", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
tenant, err := h.svc.UpdateSettings(r.Context(), tenantID, settings)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to update settings", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Mask CalDAV password before returning
tenant.Settings = maskSettingsPassword(tenant.Settings)
jsonResponse(w, tenant, http.StatusOK)
}
// ListMembers handles GET /api/tenants/{id}/members
func (h *TenantHandler) ListMembers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := auth.UserFromContext(r.Context())
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
tenantID, err := uuid.Parse(r.PathValue("id"))
if err != nil {
jsonError(w, "invalid tenant ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Verify user has access
role, err := h.svc.GetUserRole(r.Context(), userID, tenantID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to get user role", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if role == "" {
jsonError(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
members, err := h.svc.ListMembers(r.Context(), tenantID)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to list members", "error", err)
jsonError(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
jsonResponse(w, members, http.StatusOK)
}
func jsonResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, data interface{}, status int) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
}
func jsonError(w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, status int) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"error": msg})
}